Nemeth v. Shoshone County Appellant\u27s Brief Dckt. 46118 by unknown
UIdaho Law 
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law 
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs 
1-25-2019 
Nemeth v. Shoshone County Appellant's Brief Dckt. 46118 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs 
Recommended Citation 
"Nemeth v. Shoshone County Appellant's Brief Dckt. 46118" (2019). Idaho Supreme Court Records & 
Briefs, All. 7527. 
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/7527 
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at 
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All by 





Karel Lehrman, Clerk of the Court
By: Brad Thies, Deputy Clerk
MISCHELLE R. FULGHAM, ISB #4623 
LUKINS & ANNIS, P.S. 
601 E. Front Avenue, Suite 303 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814-5155 
Telephone: (208) 667-0517 
Facsimile: (208) 664-4125 
Email: mfulgham@lukins.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellants 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
PETER NEMETH, and MARY M. NEMETH 
(deceased) husband and wife, and PETER 
NEMETH, as Trustee of THE PETER AND 
MARY NEMETH FAMILY TRUST, dated 
April 28, 2009, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
V. 
SHOSHONE COUNTY, a political subdivision 
of the State of Idaho, acting through the 
SHOSHONE COUNTY BOARD OF 
COMMISSIONERS, MIKE FITZGERALD, 
JAY HUBER, and JOHN HANSEN, in their 
official capacities. 
Defendants-Respondents. 
Supreme Court Docket No. 46118 
APPELLANTS'BRIEF 
APPELLANTS'BRIEF 
Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District 
of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Shoshone 
* * * * * 
Honorable Scott Wayman, District Judge, Presiding 
MISCHELLE R. FULGHAM 
LUKINS & ANNIS, P.S. 
601 E. Front Ave. Ste 303 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
Attorneys for Appellants 
KEISHA L. OXENDINE 
SHOSHONE COUNTY PROSECUTING 
ATTORNEY 
700 Bank Street, Suite 200 
Wallace, ID 83 873 
Attorney for Respondents 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. ST A TEMENT OF THE CASE .. ..... .......... ....... .... .. ............ ............. .. .... ..... .. .... ... .. .... .... .. .. ..... 1 
A. Nature of the Case ........ ..... .......... .... ... .... ........ ............... ... ...... .. ..... .. .............. ..... 1 
B. Statement of Facts ... ..... ... .. .. .. ......... .... ..... ........... ... .. ............ ...... .... ......... .... ...... .. 1 
C. Course of Proceedings Below ........... .... ... .... ... ....... .... .... ....... ... .. ............ .... ..... . 11 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL ... .......... ....... ................................ .. ... ....... .. .... ........... 12 
II. ARGUMENT .. .... ..... , .... ... ....... ... ... .... ... .. ............. ............. ..... .............. ... .. ..... ... .... .. ........ ... .. 13 
A. Standard ofReview .. ... ..... .................. ..... ... ..... .. .. ... ........ ... ... .... .. .. .......... ...... .. .. 13 
B. The District Court Erred when it Dismissed Nemeths' Declaratory 
Relief Claim Due to Lack of State Court Jurisdiction . .... .. ...... ... .... .... .. .... .. ..... 14 
C. The District Court Erred when it Cited and Relied upon Federal Case Law as 
Establishing Binding Precedential Authority over Idaho State Courts .... ....... .19 
D. The District Court Erred When it Inferred Facts Not in the Record 
and Speculated in Favor of Shoshone County as to Why Shoshone 
County Failed to Perform its Mandatory Duty under 
Idaho Code §40-208(7) .... .... ... .... ........ ......... ................... ..... .. ..... ..... .. .. ...... ..... 20 
E. The District Court Erred when it Denied Nemeths' Sununary 
Judgment Motion . .. ...... ... .. .. .... .... .. ... .. ....... ....... ... .............. .. ...... ....... ................ 21 
IV. REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES .......... ........ .... ......... ... ... .... ..... ... ..... .... .............. ... .24 
V. CONCLUSION .. ...... ..... .. .... ... ........ .............. ....... ... .. ...... ....... .... ........ .. ... ....... ........ ..... ...... ... 25 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
Athay v. Stacey, 142 Idaho 360,365, 128 P.3d 897,902 (2005) ........ .. .... .. .. ....................... ..... .... 23 
County of Shoshone v. United States, 912 F.Supp.2d 912 (D. Idaho 2012) .. ...................... .... ... .. 19 
English v. Taylor, 160 Idaho 737,741,378 P.3d 1036, 1040, (2016) ................ ..................... .... . 20 
Euclid Avenue Trust v. City of Boise, 146 Idaho 306, 308, 193 P. 3d 853, 855 (2008) ........ ..... .. 11 
Flying A Ranch, Inc. v. Cty. Commissioners of Fremont Cty., 157 Idaho 93 7, 
342 P.3d 649, 655-56 (2015) ... ............................ .............. ...... ............. ..... ........................ ..... .. 24 
Ford, Inc. v. Universal Computer Consulting Holding, Inc., 142 Idaho 235,240, 
127 P.3d 138, 143 (2005) ................ ... ... .... ...... ......................... ... ... ...... .. ...... .. ......... ................. . 20 
Fuchs v. Idaho State Police, Alcohol Beverage Control, 153 Idaho 114, 117, 
279 P.3d 100, 103 (2012) .................. .... .. .......... .. ............... .. ..... ..... ... .. .. ..... .... ............ ... .. ......... . 24 
Galli v. Idaho County, 146 Idaho 155, 191 P.3d 233 ......... .......... ...... .... ....... ..... .. .... .......... ... ... ... . 18 
Galvin v. Canyon Highway Dist. No. 4, 134 Idaho 576,579, 6 P.3d 826, 829 (2000) .......... .. ... .. 18 
Halvorson v. North Latah County Highway District, 151 Idaho 196, 
254 P.3d 497 (2011) ...... ...... .... ...................................................... ... .... ................... 17, 21 , 22, 23 
Hoffer v. City of Boise, 151 Idaho 400,257 P.3d 1226 (2011) ......... .. ... .. ... ... ............... ...... ... ... ... . 13 
Orrockv. Appleton, 147 Idaho 613,618,213 P.3d 398,403 (2009) ...... ... .. .. .. ..... ................ ........ 13 
Ralph Naylor Farms, LLC v. Latah Cnty., 144 Idaho 806, 809, 
172 P.3d 1081 , 1084 (2007) ...... ... ... ... ... ....... .. .......................... .... .. ........ ... .. .. ... .. ... ........ ... ...... ... 24 
Schneider v. Howe, 142 Idaho 767, 769, 133 P.3d 1232, 1234 (2006) .... ....... ........ .... ..... 17, 21, 22 
Shoshone County v. United States, 912 F. Supp. 2d 912 (D. Idaho 2012) ..... .. ..... .. .... ..... ... .... ... .. 20 
Smith v. Smith, 160 Idaho 778,786,379 P.3d 1048, 1056 (2016) .. .......... .. .. .. .............. ... ..... .. .... . 20 
Sopatykv. LemhiCounty, 264P.3d916,924, 151 Idaho809,817(2011) ...... .................. 17, 18, 19 
Valiant Idaho, LLCv. JV L.L.C., 164 Idaho 280,429 P.3d 168 (2018) ............................ .. ...... ... 14 
Waters Garbage v. Shoshone Cnty., 138 Idaho 648, 651, 67 P.3d 1260, 1263 (2003) ........ ... ..... 23 
Statutes 
Idaho Code§ 12-117 ...... ........ ........................ ...... .... .. ...................... .......... .............................. ..... 24 
Idaho Code § 40- 202(3) ............................................ ..................... ....................... ....................... 23 
Idaho Code§ 40-203A .... .... .................................... .. ...................... ............. .................... 13, 15, 18 
Idaho Code§ 40-204A ........ ..................... ...... .. ............... ............... .............. ... 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17 
Idaho Code § 40-204A(5) ................ .. ........... .................................... ........... ......................... .... ... . 15 
Idaho Code§ 40-208(7) .. ............ ......... ... ................. ...... .... .......... ........ . 1, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18 
Idaho Code§ 10-1201 ................. .......... ...... ..... ...... ..... .................... ... ... .. .. .. .. ...... ..... .... ...... .... ... . 1, 21 
Revised Statute 2477 .. ................ ... ... .. ... .. ............. ......... .... ....... ..... .. 1, 13 , 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 24, 25 
Other Authorities 
Idaho Filing Fee Category A ..... ..... .... ...... ...... ................................ ............... ........................ .... .... 11 
Idaho Filing Fee Category L (3) ... ....... ..... .. ... ..... ............ .. ............... .... ...... .... .. .... .................. .. .... . 11 
Rules 
Idaho Appellate Rule 40 .............. .... .. ....... .... ..... ........ .. .................... ..... ..... ........................ .. ... .. .... 24 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b )( 6) .... ... .. .... .................................. ... ... .. .......................... ....... 13 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) .. .. ......... ...... .............................. ..... .. ................... .. ......... ....... 21 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 8 ......... ... ... ...... ........ .. .. ... ........ .... .. ...... .. ........... .......................... .... 13 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 8( a) .......... .. .... ... .. .............. .. ............ ...................... ... .. ............. ...... 13 
11 
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This case is an appeal from the dismissal of a declaratory relief claim and the denial of a 
summary judgment motion as ordered by the Idaho District Court for the First Judicial District, 
Shoshone County. Appellants PETER NEMETH, and MARY M. NEMETH (deceased) husband 
and wife, and PETER NEMETH, as Trustee of THE PETER AND MARY NEMETH FAMILY 
TRUST, dated April 28, 2009 (collectively "Nemeths") own real property and mining patents 
which are accessed via Granite Gulch Road in Shoshone County. The Road crosses federal land 
before reaching Nemeths' property and mining claims. Nemeths petitioned for public road 
validation, but the Shoshone County Board of County Commissioners ignored their request. 
Instead, the Shoshone County Board of County Commissioners instructed Nemeths to pursue 
their legal remedies under Idaho Code§ 40-208(7). Nemeths then filed this state court action, 
and brought a summary judgment motion, seeking declaratory relief to have Granite Gulch Road 
judicially declared a valid Revised Statute 2477 public right of way, pursuant to Idaho Code§ 
40-204A, Idaho Code§ 40-208 (7), and Idaho Code §10-1201. The District Court dismissed 
Nemeths' declaratory relief case pursuant to Idaho Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(6), determining 
that the Idaho state cowi lacked subject matter jurisdiction and holding that federal courts have 
exclusive jurisdiction over Revised Statute 2477 public road validation claims involving federal 
lands. Nemeths seek to have the District Comi's dismissal overturned and to have declaratory 
relief granted, with Granite Gulch Road judicially declared a public right of way. 
B. Statement of Facts 
Based on the exhibits presented with the Nemeths' Verified Petition and the exhibits to 
the Fulgham Declaration in Support of Summary Judgment, the record herein is factually 
undisputed that the creation of what is now known as "Granite Gulch Road" and what was 
1 
previously known as "Raven-Cedar Creek Road" occurred and the subject Road was completed 
with public funds on October 1, 1906. The 1905-1906 Report of the Idaho Intermountain Wagon 
Commission documents and evidences that construction of the Road was completed on October 
1, 1906. In the Record on Appeal at Exhibit A to the Verified Petition and at Exhibit A to the 
Fulgham Declaration in Supp01i of Summary Judgment, R. pp. 6, 204-233 and R. pp. 145-153, 
is the Idaho Intermountain Wagon Commission Report, which expressly states: 
THE RA VEN-CEDAR CREEK ROAD reaches from Raven, a village on Prichard 
Creek, up Granite and Cedar Creeks, to the Cedar Creek Mine, in Shoshone 
County, a distance of 2 Yz miles. 
Contract for this road was let June 30t\ 1906 to J.H. Jackson of Wallace, Idaho, for 
$2,500 and the engineering and advertising expenses were $67 .00, making a total of 
$2,567, of this the County of Shoshone paid $1,290 and the State $1,267. The road 
was completed on October 1st, 1906. The work on this road was very heavy and the 
contractor reports a loss of $1,400. 
This road opens up a mining country of promise, formerly served by trails only. 
There are three or four good prospects along the line of this road that promise to be 
mines very shortly. Mr. Chas. F. 0. Merriam of Wallace was the engineer in charge 
of this road. 
See Idaho Intermountain Wagon Commission Publication attached to Verified Petition, Exhibit 
A, p. 8 (emphasis added). R.p.152. Shoshone County and the State of Idaho paid for the 
construction of this public road. Id. 
Based upon public records and published evidence, after construction of the Road in 1906 
at public expense, the Road continued to exist and continued to provide the public with access to 
mining operations near Raven, Granite Creek, Cedar Creek, and Prichard Creek. Id. at Exhibits 
A, B, and C. R.pp.145-153 (Exhibit A); R. pp. 81-85 (Exhibit B); R.pp.86-106, pp. 9-50 (Exhibit 
C). 
In 1906, when the Road was created, Idaho state law required the road to be regularly 
used by the public for a period not less than five years in order to constitute a public right-of-
way. Verified Petition, Exhibit B. R. pp. 81 -85. 
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On December 7, 1922, the United States Surveyor General's Office, through the United 
States Surveyor General for Idaho, platted and recorded the Claim of Cedar Creek Mining and 
Developing Company for the Cedar Creek, St. John, Black Bear, Thomas, Sunny Side, Palace, 
Palace No. 2, and Grace lodes in the Summit Mining District, in Shoshone County, Idaho. 
Fulgham Declaration, Exhibit B-1. R. p. 455. 
Within and upon such recorded Plat Map, the Road (previously known as Cedar Creek 
Road, and currently known as Granite Gulch Road) is depicted and memorialized as providing 
continued and regular road access to the Cedar Creek Mill site. Id. Exhibit B-1, R, p. 455. 
From 1921 to 1936, Cedar Creek Mining and Development Company operated in "full 
force." R. pp. 456-462. The mine continued to use Cedar Creek Road to both access the Cedar 
Creek mines and to haul ore and concentrate out of the Cedar Creek area. Multiple published 
articles in Northwest History: Mining, Mill & Mining detail the continued mining activity along 
Cedar Creek Road. See Cedar Creek Mining Publications attached to Fulgham Declaration, 
Exhibit B-2. R. pp. 456-462; R. p. 248. 
In 1929, Respondent Shoshone County, Idaho, through its Officer of General County 
Road Supervisor, in Wallace, Idaho, published a Shoshone County map depicting and 
memorializing the Road as existing and described as an "unimproved road." Fulgham 
Declaration, Exhibit B-3. R. p. 414. 
Between 1928 and 1933, the Cedar Creek Mining Company was hauling lead 
concentrates on the Road from Cedar Creek twelve miles to Pritchard, a station on the branch 
line of the Oregon-Washington Railroad & Navigation Company. Fulgham Declaration, Exhibit 
B-4. R. pp. 415-416. 
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Between 1909 and 1930, Cedar Creek Mining Company produced 5,421 tons of ore, 
33.88 ounces of gold, 23,481 ounces of silver, 5,039 pounds of copper, and 910,713 pounds of 
lead. Id. R. p. 416. 
Also in 1929, the United States Department of Agriculture, on its Coeur d'Alene National 
Forest Service map, documented and memorialized the Road as continuing to exist, identifying 
and describing the Road as a "good motor road". Verified Petition, Exhibit C-1. R. pp. 86-91. 
In 1939, the United States Department of Agriculture, on its Coeur d'Alene National 
Forest Service map, again documented and memorialized the Road as continuing to exist, 
identifying the Road as a "good motor road". Verified Petition, Exhibit C-2. R. pp. 92-94. 
Also in 1939, the Metsker Map Company, on its Shoshone County, State ofldaho map, 
likewise documented and memorialized the Road as continuing to exist, identifying the Road as 
a "an improved road". Verified Petition, Exhibit C-3. R. pp. 95-97. 
In 1948, the United States Department of Agriculture, on its Coeur d'Alene National 
Forest Service map, again documented and memorialized the Road as continuing to exist, 
identifying the Road as a "good motor road". Verified Petition, Exhibit C-4. R. pp. 98-102. 
In May 10, 1949, the Silver Mining Company Prospectus and Statutory Statement stated 
the original purpose of the Road being to provide public access for the various mines located in 
the Gulch. Verified Petition, Exhibit D. R. pp. 114-124. Specifically, the Silver Circle Mining 
Company transported mining materials to and from the Summit Mining District (in Coeur 
d'Alene, in Shoshone County, Idaho.) Id. R. p. 116. The Road served as an access point for the 
Silver Strike's patented mill site. 
The Silver Circle Mining Company Prospectus states in relevant part: 
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Exhibit 11 
Silver Circle Mining Company was organized under the laws of the State ofldaho on 
May 3, 1937, for the purpose of engaging in development and production oflead, 
silver, zinc, and other valuable minerals from lode mining claims held by location 
and lease in Summit Mining District in the Coeur d'Alene, in Shoshone County, 
Idaho. 
*** 
Silver Strike owns 5 patented lode mining claims, a patented mill site, and 34 unpatented 
lode mining claims on which in excess of $400,000 has been expended. 
Fulgham Deel., Exhibit D at 2. (emphasis added) R. p. 116. 
Exhibit 12 
Silver Circle Mining Company owns six unpatented lode mining claims on which there 
are no improvements and the property has no assessed value, together with a 25-year 
lease on mine, ore-bodies and mill of Silver Strike Mining company and an easement 
contract permitting use of Silver Strike underground workings for development at 
depth of Silver circle claims. Silver Strike buildings consist of shop and compressor 
house, meter panel house, tool house, dry house, cook house, bunk house, seven-
room dwelling house, horse barn, two garages and mill buildings. Equipment 
consists of 100-ton straight flotation concentrator, electronically operated; Blake 
jaw crusher, rolls, elevator, Ball mill, 16 float cells, motors, tools, etc. Mine is fully 
equipped with tracks and cars, air ventilator, air lines, hoist, drills, tools, etc. 
Valuation as carried on books of Silver Strike Mining Company is $329,139.47. 
Id. (emphasis added) R. p. 116. 
THE CORPORATION AND CAPITAL 
SIL VER CIRCLE MINING COMP ANY was organized under the laws of the State of 
Idaho, May 3, 1937, with a capital of $300,000, divided into 3,000,000 shares of fully 
paid and non-assessable common stock, par value 1 Oc. 
This Company acquired by purchase six unpatented mining claims adjoined Silver Strike 
Mining Company's properties and in the immediate vicinity of the famous Hercules 
mine, Shoshone County, Idaho. 
Id. at 4. (emphasis added) R. p. 112. 
IMPROVEMENTS 
There are ample buildings to meet all needs for some time to come consisting of mill 
building, shop and compressor house, meter panel house, tool house, dry house, cook 
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house, seven-room dwelling, log dwelling, office building, horse barn, and two garages. 
The mine is equipped with compressor, cars, heavy rails, air ventilation system, hoist 
machine drills and tools. 
Id. at 7; R. p. 112 
CONCLUSION: As was explained under "Geology" the conditions are right for the 
formation of large ore bodies at depth in the Cedar Creek property. The mine is 
accessible, and completely equipped, or has been mined, there is ore in sight, and 
there should be a great deal more below and towards the southwest. From the 
standpoint of a miner, Cedar Creek is worth while. 
JOHN B. PLATTS 
Wallace, Idaho November 21, 1934 
Id. at 8; R. p. 121. (emphasis added). Note: See 1934 plat map diagram depicting the Road 
providing access to Silver Strike (formerly Cedar Creek, Hercules, and Hecla mine prope1iies). 
In two survey reports conducted in 1924 and 194 7, the inspectors identify the Road as a 
"good road ... with no steep grades, and can be reached by auto" and as "a no1mal, rural dirt 
road ... that is not difficult," Verified Petition, Exhibit Eat 1, 5. R. p. 126, and p. 130. 
The surveys also detail the numerous dwellings and mining equipment around the area as 
follows: 
REPORT OF THE CEDAR CREEK MINE 
NEAR MURRAY, IDAHO 
By H.M. Childs 
May 24, 1924 
In company with Wm. And John Weir of Wallace, I visited the Cedar Creek mine, 
which is on Granite Creek, about four miles south-east of Murray, Idaho. There is a 
good road for this distance with no steep grades, and can be reached by auto. There 
are 29 claims in the group, 10 of which have been surveyed for patent. Abundant timber 
covers about half of the claims to the east of Granite Creek, where they have a 10,000 
foot capacity saw mill which has cut all their lumber. 
Good water power is obtained from Granite Creek, for paii of the year, but Spokane 
electric power has been installed as more reliable. 
The camp is situated on Granite Creek just below the No. 3 tunnel, and consists of a 
boarding house and two bunk houses, large enough for 20 men. 
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At the portal of No. 3 tunnel is a 2 drill compressor, driven with either water or electric 
power. A blacksmith shop, ore bins, and store house are located here also. 
Id. at 1. (emphasis added) R. p.126 
REPORT OF INSPECTION TRIP TO THE CEDAR CREEK PROPERTY OF THE 
SIL VER STRIKE MINING COMPANY, CONTROLLED BY THE SIL VER CIRCLE 
MINING CO. 
May 2, 1947 
General 
The Cedar Creek Mine is located approximately six miles from Murray, Idaho and 
is reached by following the road along Prichard Creek to the mouth of Granite 
Creek and thence up Granite Creek to the property. The road from Murray to the 
property is normal, rural dirt road and is not difficult, save in the winter months. 
Id. at 5. (emphasis added). R. p .130 
In 1954, the United States Department of Agriculture, on its Coeur d'Alene National 
Forest Service map, again documented and memorialized the Road as continuing to exist, 
identifying the Road as a "good motor road". Verified Petition, Exhibit C-5. R. p.p.103-104. 
In 1964, the United States Department of Agriculture, on its Coeur d'Alene National 
Forest Service map, again documented and memorialized the Road as continuing to exist, 
identifying the Road as a "dirt road". Verified Petition, Exhibit C-6. R. p.p. 105-106. 
In 1966, the United States Depaiiment of Agriculture, on its Coeur d'Alene National 
Forest Service map for the Wallace Ranger District, again documented and memorialized the 
Road as continuing to exist, identifying the Road as "an improved road". Verified Petition, 
Exhibit C-7. R. p.p. 9-11. 
In 1966, the Idaho Department of Highways, in cooperation with the United States 
Depaiiment of Transp01iation, the Federal Highway Administration, and Bureau of Public Roads 
published its General Highway Map of Shoshone County, Idaho. The General Highway Map 
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depicted the Road as continuing to exist and described the Road as "an unimproved road." 
Verified Petition, Exhibit C-8. R. p.p. 12-14. 
In 1972, the United States Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, on its Coeur 
d'Alene National Forest Service map, again documented and memorialized the Road as 
continuing to exist, identifying the Road as a "dirt road". Verified Petition, Exhibit C-9. R. 
p.p.15-17 
In 1974, the United States Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, on its Forest Travel 
Plan for the Idaho Panhandle National Forest, again documented and memorialized the Road as 
continuing to exist, identifying the Road as a "dirt road". Verified Petition, Exhibit C-10. R. p.p. 
18-2 1. 
In 1977, the Big Sky Map Company published its new and up to date map of Shoshone 
County, Idaho and designated the Road as an "existing" road. Verified Petition, Exhibit C-11. R. 
p.p. 22-23. 
In 1978, the United States Department of Interior, Bureau of Land Management 
published its Thompson Falls, Montana - Idaho Map, depicting the Road as a street connecting 
the Village of Raven with the area's mining operations. Verified Petition, Exhibit C-12. R. p.p. 
24-26. 
In 1981 , the United States Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, on its Forest 
Visitors Map for the Idaho Panhandle National Forests (Coeur d'Alene National Forest) for 
Idaho and Montana, again documented and memorialized the Road as continuing to exist, 
identifying the Road as a "primitive road". Verified Petition, Exhibit C-13. R.p.p. 27-30. 
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In 1985, United States Department of Geological Surveys published its Burke, Idaho -
Montana Map, depicting the Road as "an Unimproved Road." Verified Petition, Exhibit C-14. 
R. p. 31-34. 
In 1989, the United States Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, on its Map for the 
Idaho Panhandle National Forests, Central, Idaho and Montana, again documented and 
memorialized the Road as continuing to exist, identifying the Road as a "primitive road". 
Verified Petition, Exhibit C-15. R. p.p. 35-38. 
In 1996, the United States Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, published its Burke 
Quadrangle Idaho-Montana map, and documented and memorialized the Road as continuing to 
exist, identifying the Road as an "unimproved, 4 wheel drive" road. Verified Petition, Exhibit C-
16. R. p.p. 39-43 . 
In 2001 , the United States Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, and the United 
States Department of Interior, Bureau of Land Management, published its Coeur d'Alene Field 
Office Travel Plan Map for the Idaho Panhandle National Forests and the Upper Columbia-
Salmon Clearwater District, which removed the Road from the map. Verified Petition, Exhibit 
C-17. R. p.p. 44-47. 
In 2003 , the Idaho Panhandle National Forest map also showed the Road as removed 
from the map. Verified Petition, Exhibit C-18. R. p.p. 48-50. 
In 2013, the United States Depaiiment of Agriculture, through the Forest Service and the 
United States Depaiiment of the Interior, through the United States Geological Survey, published 
its BURKE QUADRANGLE IDAHO - MONTANA map of the Burke, Idaho - Montana area. 
The map depicts and memorializes Granite Gulch Road, the Road at issue in this litigation, as an 
existing "4WD", 4-wheel drive road. Verified Petition, Exhibit F. R. p.p. 69-71. 
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The Road continues to provide 4-wheel access to the area, including access to present day 
hiking trails. Through the Idaho Panhandle National Forests' website that provides the public 
with directions, the Forest Service explicitly acknowledges the Road's existence and advises 
hikers to utilize it in order to access the trailheads. Verified Petition, Exhibit G. R. p.p. 134-136. 
The National Forest Service provides access directions at 
www.fa.usda.gov/recarea/ipnf/reacreation and www.go-idaho.com/Barton-Creek-Trail-No-140/ 
to the Bruton Creek Trail as of November 6, 2014, and again almost a yeru· later on July 5, 2015. 
The U.S.F.S. websites instruct the public to use the existing Granite Gulch Road, stating: 
Access #1: From Coeur d'Alene, Idaho drive east on I-90 taking the Kingston exit #43. 
After exiting, travel north on Forest Highway 9 (FH9) 23 miles to Forest Road #208 
(FR208). Turn east and continue on FH-9 through Murray, Idaho for another 3.7 miles, 
making a right turn at Granite Gulch Road. The trailhead is approximately .1 mile 
up Granite Gulch. Follow signs. 
Id. at 1. (emphasis added). R. p.135. 
During the Fall of 2016, Nemeths contracted to sell their property, including their mining 
patents, to a willing buyer. The sale was scheduled for closing but did not close due to road 
access questions raised by the title company handling the closing. R. p. 539, Tr. p. 16 lns. 1-16. 
In order to proceed with the pending sale, Nemeths had to confirm the longstanding public road 
status of Granite Gulch Road. 
On September 22, 2016, Nemeths petitioned Defendants for public right-of-way 
validation of Granite Gulch Road. Verified Petition, R. p. 215, para. 38, Exhibit H. R. pp. 327-
334. Shoshone County ignored the Petition and refused to take any action. 
After nearly eight months of delay, on May 17, 2017, Respondent Shoshone County 
responded to Nemeths' outstanding request for Public Right-of-Way Validation of Granite Gulch 
Road. In their letter, the Shoshone County Commissioners admitted their failure to act, stating as 
follows: At this time, the Board of County Commissioners has failed to act pursuant to your 
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request. You are hereby given notice of its failure to act, and as a result, may exercise any 
remedies available pursuant to Idaho Code, including but not limited to LC. 40-208(7). 
Verified Petition, Exhibit I, R. p. 336 (emphasis added). 
Based upon the foregoing facts and the express admission by Shoshone County of its 
"failure to act" and the authority of Nemeths to pursue any remedies under state law, Nemeths 
pursued their state court judicial remedies and sought declaratory relief on a motion for summary 
judgment validating Granite Gulch Road under LC. 40-208(7). R. p. 336; R. p. 6; and R. pp. 269-
288. 
C. Course of Proceedings Below 
On September 22, 2016, Nemeths petitioned Shoshone County for public road validation 
of Granite Gulch Road. Tr. p. 7 lns. 8-9; R. p. 215 para. 37 Exhibit I, R. p. 336. 
On June 14, 2017, Nemeths filed their Verified Petition for Declaratory Relief, under Fee 
Category A 1• R. p. 6-262 
On August 22, 2017, Shoshone County filed a Motion to Dismiss but did not file a 
supporting brief or set it for hearing. R. p. 266-268. 
On January 2, 2018, Nemeths filed their Motion for Summary Judgment, including 
Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment and the supporting Declaration of 
Mischelle R. Fulgham, with Exhibits A-1. R. p. 269-471. 
1 Fee Category A applies to "All initial civil case filings in District Cowi of any type not listed in categories E, F. 
and H(l)." Notably, Nemeth did not file under Fee Category L. However, at some unknown time after the filing, the 
Shoshone County Clerk of Cowi unilaterally changed and altered the Nemeth filing by adding handwriting and 
adding the Fee Category A - L(3) in an apparent attempt by the Shoshone County District Court Clerk to inse1i the 
fee category L(3) for "an appeal from the commissioners." However, this was not Nemeths ' fee category 
designation or intent when filing their civil action for declaratory relief against Shoshone County. Under Euclid 
Avenue Trust v. City of Boise, 146 Idaho 306, 308, 193 P. 3d 853, 855 (2008) the filing fee category of A governs. 
Because the Commissioners refused to take any action, and instructed Nemeths to seek judicial remedies under J.C. 
§40-208(7), there was no Board record, transcript, or decision to appeal under Fee Category L(3). It was improper 
for the Shoshone County District Court Clerk to alter the Nemeths ' filing by handwriting and inserting Fee Category 
L(3). 
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On January 2, 2018, Shoshone County filed its Memorandum in Support of Motion to 
Dismiss. R. p. 474-483 . 
On January 4, 2018, Shoshone County objected to Nemeths' hearing for summary 
judgment. R. p. 472-473. 
On January 22, 2018, Nemeths opposed Shoshone County's Motion to Dismiss and filed 
their Reply in Support of Summary Judgment. R. p. 484-503. 
On January 29, 2018, Shoshone County District Court Judge Scott Wayman heard oral 
arguments and issued his oral ruling granting Shoshone County's motion to dismiss and denying 
Nemeths' motion for summary judgment. Tr. p.1 -37; R. p. 504-510; and R. p. 536-.545. 
On February 28, 2108, Shoshone County District Court Judge Wayman issued his written 
order denying Nemeths' motion for summary judgment and granting Shoshone County's motion 
to dismiss. R. p. 523-525. 
On April 11, 2018, Nemeths timely filed this appeal. R. p. 526-530. 
On July 13, 2018, the Idaho Supreme Court conditionally dismissed this appeal as the 
District Court had not entered a final judgment. 
On July 25, 2018, Shoshone County District Court Judge Scott Wayman entered a final 
judgment, dismissing the Nemeths' case. 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the District Comt e1T when it dismissed Nemeths' case under Idaho Civil 
Procedure Rule 12(b)(6) on the grounds that it lacked jurisdiction? 
2. Did the District Comt en when it held that federal courts have exclusive 
jurisdiction over public road validation cases involving federal lands petitioned under Idaho 
Code §40-204A and Idaho Code §40-208(7)? 
3. Did the District Court en when it cited and relied upon federal case law as 
binding precedent for dismissal of this state court action? 
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4. Did the District Court err when it excused Shoshone County's failure to act, 
inferred facts not in the record, and relied upon speculated reasons for Shoshone County's failure 
to follow the mandatory road validation proceedings set out in Idaho Code §40-203A, Idaho 
Code § 40-204A, and Idaho Code § 40-208(7)? 
5. Did the District Court err when it denied Nemeths' summary judgment motion for 
declaratory relief that Granite Gulch Road was a valid R.S. 2477 public right-of-way? 
III. ARGUMENT 
A. Standard of Review 
A district court's dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief 
could be granted shall be reviewed de novo on appeal. Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b )( 6); 
Hoffer v. City of Boise, 151 Idaho 400, 257 P .3d 1226 (2011 ). 
The interpretation of a statute is an issue of law over which this court exercises free 
review. Hoffer v. City of Boise, 151 Idaho 400, 402, 257 P .3d 1226, 1228, (2011 ). 
This Court reviews de novo a district comi's dismissal of a complaint under I.R.C.P. 
12(b )( 6) for failure to state a claim. Hoffer v. City of Boise, 151 Idaho 400, 402, 257 P .3d 1226, 
1228 (2011). Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 8 requires a complaint to contain a "short and plain 
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." I.R.C.P. 8(a) Accordingly, 
on review of a dismissal this Comi dete1mines "whether the non-movant has alleged sufficient 
facts in support of his claim, which if true, would entitle him to relief." Hoffer, 151 Idaho at 402, 
257 P.3d at 1228 (quoting Orrockv. Appleton, 147 Idaho 613,618,213 P.3d 398,403 (2009)). 
In doing so, the Court draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Id. 
The standard ofreview for the denial ofNemeths' summary judgment motion is de novo. 
The Idaho Supreme Comi reviews an appeal from an order on summary judgment de novo, and 
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the Supreme Court's standard of review is the same as the standard used by the trial court in 
ruling on a motion for summary judgment. Valiant Idaho, LLC v. JV L.L.C., 164 Idaho 280,429 
P.3d 168 (2018). 
B. The District Court Erred when it Dismissed Nemeths' Declaratory Relief 
Claim Due to Lack of State Court Jurisdiction. 
Despite expressly holding that Idaho Code§ 40-204A provides one of two possible ways 
to establish a public right of way across federal land, the District Court later contradicted itself, 
and dismissed the Nemeths ' case on grounds that state comis lack jurisdiction and only federal 
comis have exclusive jurisdiction over public road validation cases involving Federal lands. R.p. 
543, Tr. P. 29 Ins. 15-25; p. 31 Ins. 17-25; p. 33 Ins. 16-21. R.p. 544. By ignoring and refusing 
to implement Idaho state law, including Idaho Code § 40-203A, Idaho Code §40-204A and 
Idaho Code § 40-208(7), instead holding that federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction, the 
District Comi committed reversible e1Tor. The Comi should not have dismissed Nemeths' 
Declaratory Relief claim. R. p. 543 -544. 
Initially, the District Court conectly and accurately ruled that Idaho state law provides a 
methodology for establishing a public right of way over federal lands. Judge Wayman expressly 
held: 
So from my review of this case and the applicable law, it appears to the Comi that 
there are two possible ways by which a public right-of-way can be established 
across Federal land. 
One is follow Idaho Code § 40-204A which sets forth the procedure on the county 
level that never took place in this case. 
The other is to file an action under the Federal quiet title act. That is specifically 
authorized under Federal law, and there is ce1iainly some authority for that, 
although it is not without peril. As pointed out by Judge Bush, there are issues of 
standing when a private citizen is trying to establish a public right-of-way. 
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R. p. 543; Tr. p. 29 Ins. 15-23. 
However, despite holding that Idaho Code§ 40-204A provided "one of two ways by which a 
public right of way can be established across federal land", the District Court went on to reject 
the first possible way, i.e. Nemeths' state court proceedings under LC. § 40-204A(5), Idaho Code 
§ 40-203A, and also pursuant to LC. § 40-208(7), holding that only federal courts have exclusive 
jurisdiction for Idaho Code§ 40-204A claims for public roads over federal lands. R. p. 544; Tr. 
p. 33 Ins. 14-18. Such a self-contradictory ruling constitutes judicial e1rnr and should be reversed 
by this Supreme Court on appeal. 
The state of Idaho, through its legislature, has adopted statutes allowing public road 
validation proceedings, including R.S. 2477 road validation proceedings -without requiring the 
filing of a federal court action. Idaho Code§ 40-204A (5). Pursuant to LC. § 40-204A(5), a 
public right of way over federal land may be established through state court proceedings. In the 
Nemeths' case, the District Cowi found that a "One possible way by which a public right-of-way 
can be established across Federal land, is under Idaho Code§ 40-204A" (R. p. 543; Tr. p. 29 
Ins. 15-19). Idaho Code§ 40-204A(5) states: 
(5) Any member of the public, the state ofldaho and any of its political 
subdivisions, and any agency of the federal government may choose to seek 
validation of its rights under law to use granted rights-of-way either through 
a process set forth by the state of Idaho, through processes set forth by any 
federal agency or by proclamation of user rights granted under the provisions 
of the original act, Revised Statute 2477. 
Idaho Code§ 40-204A(5) (emphasis added). 
Similarly, Idaho state law LC. § 40-208(7), provides additional relevant statutory 
authority for a state court proceeding by "other available judicial means" to establish a public 
road validation proceeding when the commissioners fail to act. This relevant Idaho statutory 
authority provides: 
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(7) Any person other than a board of county or highway district commissioners 
seeking a determination of the legal status or the width of a highway or 
public right-of-way shall first petition for the initiation of validation or 
abandonment proceedings, or both, as provided for in sections 40-203(1 )(b) and 
40-203A(l), Idaho Code. If the commissioners having jurisdiction over the 
highway system do not initiate a proceeding in response to such a petition 
within thirty (30) days, the person may seek a determination by quiet title or 
other available judicial means. When the legal status or width of a highway or 
public right-of-way is disputed and where a board of county or highway district 
commissioners wishes to determine the legal status or width of a highway or 
public right-of-way, the commissioners shall initiate validation or abandonment 
proceedings, or both, as provided for in sections 40-203 and 40-203A, Idaho 
Code, rather than initiating an action for quiet title. If proceedings pursuant to the 
provisions of section 40-203 or 40-203A, Idaho Code, are initiated, those 
proceedings and any appeal or remand there from shall provide the exclusive 
basis for determining the status and width of the highway, and no court shall have 
jurisdiction to dete1mine the status or width of said highway except by way of 
judicial review provided for in this section. Provided that nothing in this 
subsection shall preclude determination of the legal status or width of a public 
road in the course of an eminent domain proceeding, as provided for in chapter 7, 
title 7, Idaho Code. LC 40-208(7), (emphasis added). 
Nemeths agree with the District Court's holding that Idaho Code§ 40-204A provides one 
of two ways (state proceeding or federal proceeding) for a complaining party, such as the 
Nemeths, to seek and obtain a R.S. 2477 public right of way across federal land. Under this 
Idaho statute, LC.§ 40-204A(5), the Nemeths "may choose to seek validation of its rights under 
law to use granted rights-of-way either through a process set forth by the state of lda/10 or 
through processes set forth by any federal agency by proclamation of user rights granted 
under the provisions of the original act, Revised Statute 2477." Thus, Nemeths have the choice 
to proceed under federal procedures or through state law, including a statut01y right to a "seek a 
detennination of the legal status or the width of a highway or public right-of-way". LC.§ 40-
208(7). If the commissioners fail to initiate a proceeding in response to the petition, as the 
Shoshone County Commissioners admittedly failed to do in response to the Nemeths' petition 
herein, then under Idaho Code§ 40-208(7), the Nemeths are legally entitled to "seek a 
determination by quiet title or other available judicial means." 
The Nemeths fully complied with LC. § 40-204A(5) and LC. § 40-208(7) when they 
utilized the "process set fo1ih by the state of Idaho ... for proclamation of user rights granted 
under the provisions of the original act, Revised Statute 2477." The Nemeths' also fully 
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complied with "the process set forth by the state of Idaho" when they filed this state court action 
seeking "other available judicial means", i.e. declaratory relief against Defendant Shoshone 
County Board of County Commissioners for its failure and refusal to act on the Nemeths' 
petition. Thus, the Nemeths' action herein was properly filed "as a state process" under I.C. § 
40-204A(5), "seeking a determination by other available judicial means" under I.C. § 40-208(7) 
in Idaho state court. 
The Nemeths' declaratory relief action did not need to be filed exclusively in federal 
court. Nowhere does either LC. § 40-204A(5) or LC. § 40-208(7) state that the only "other 
available judicial means" for redress of the County's failure to act is in federal court. Similarly, 
no Idaho state law decision has interpreted Idaho Code§ 40-204A(5) or Idaho Code§ 40-208(7) 
to mandate or require the filing a federal court action as the exclusive "available judicial means" 
to address Shoshone County's failure and refusal to act on a public right-of- way petition. The 
express language of LC. § 40-204A evidences that either a state proceeding Q! a federal 
proceeding are appropriate methods for establishing a R.S. 2477 public right of way. By stating 
that federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction and dismissing Nemeths' claim, the District Court 
herein got this holding wrong. 
Numerous Idaho state court decisions have properly addressed public right of way 
petitions in state court. Sopatyk v. Lemhi County, 264 P.3d 916,924, 151 Idaho 809, 817(2011); 
Halvorson v. North Latah County Highway District, 151 Idaho 196,254 P.3d 497 (2011) and 
Schneider v. Howe, 142 Idaho 767, 769, 133 P.3d 1232, 1234 (2006); 
In Sopatyk v. Lemhi County, 264 P.3d 916, 924, 151 Idaho 809, 817 (2011), the Idaho 
Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether state law procedures govern the validation of a 
R.S. 2477 road that covers federal land. The Court held that state law procedures govern and 
apply to R.S. 2477 road validation claims - even where federal land is involved. In affoming the 
validation of a R.S. 2477 road across U.S. Forest Service land, this Court wrote: 
The County Has Authority to Validate Anderson Creek Road Even Though It 
Intrudes into a National Forest. 
Sopatyk next argues that the Board lacks the authority to validate ACR because in 
some places it drifts onto land owned by the U.S. Forest Service. As described 
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above, however, R.S. 2477 expressly permitted states to establish rights-of-
way on federal land so long as the property is in the public domain. Galli v. 
Idaho County, 146 Idaho 55 at 159, 191 P.3d at 237. ACR became a public road 
by legislative declaration. It was not until 1906 that President Theodore Roosevelt 
created the Lemhi Forest Reserve, withdrawing the land around Gibbonsville 
from the public domain. Proclamation No. 672, 34 Stat. 3248, 3248-49 (Nov. 5, 
1906). ACR was therefore a public road before the underlying land became 
ineligible for such development. Further, the Board did not create new public 
rights when it validated ACR in 2005, as validation proceedings merely confirm 
preexisting public rights in state roads. Galvin v. Canyon Highway Dist. No. 4, 
134 Idaho 576, 579, 6 P.3d 826, 829 (2000) (citing LC. § 40-203A). It was 
therefore within the County's legal authority to validate ACR even if it does 
invade National Forest land. 
Sopatyk v. Lemhi City., 151 Idaho 809,817,264 P.3d 916, 924 (2011) (emphasis added). 
Contrary to the mandatory federal court jurisdiction and the lack of state court 
jurisdiction ruling issued herein by Shoshone County District Court Judge Wayman, in Sopatyk, 
the Idaho Supreme Court expressly described the state courts' role in reviewing these types of 
R.S. 2477 public road validation cases over federal lands. "This Court's role, therefore, is simply 
to determine whether it was clear enor for the Board to determine that validating ACR was in the 
public interest. LC. § 40- 208(7) ... " Sopatyk v. Lemhi Cty., 151 Idaho 809,816,264 P.3d 916, 
923 (2011). (emphasis added). Based upon the Idaho Supreme Court's description of "this 
Court's role" in reviewing R.S. 2477 public road validation claims over federal lands, it is clear 
that Idaho state courts have a role reviewing R.S. 2477 road validation cases over federal lands 
and there is no exclusive or mandatory federal court jurisdiction for these cases. Thus, as a 
matter of law, it was clear enor for the District Court to deny summary judgment and to dismiss 
Nemeths' case as lacking state court jurisdiction and mandating exclusive federal comi 
jurisdiction. 
Moreover, this Court in Sopatyk also addressed the legislative history of R.S 2477 roads 
and how imp01iant the public use of such roads is to the citizens of Idaho. 
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The Legislature has recognized that ' existing federal land rights of way are 
extremely important to all of Idaho's citizens. Two-thirds of Idaho's land is under 
control of the federal government and access to such federal lands is integral to 
public use.' Act of Mar. 25, 1993, ch. 142, § 1, 1993 Idaho Sess. Laws 375,376 
(creating LC. § 40-204A, governing creation of public thoroughfares under R.S. 
2477). 
Sopatykv. Lemhi Cty., 151 Idaho 809, 816-17, 264 P.3d 916, 923- 24 (2011). 
Thus, Idaho citizens have "extremely important interests" in public roads over federal 
lands and in order to protect these interests, Idaho courts have jurisdiction over state law 
proceedings seeking to validate roads as R.S. 2477 public roads, even where the road intrudes 
into a national forest. It is not necessary for an Idaho citizen (or any claimant) to file a mandatory 
or exclusive federal court action. As a result, the District Court's contrary ruling should be 
reversed. 
C. The District Court Erred when it Cited and Relied upon Federal Case Law 
as Establishing Binding Precedential Authority over Idaho State Courts. 
In dismissing the Nemeths' case, the District Court cited and relied upon federal court 
authority as set out in County of Shoshone v. United States, 912 F.Supp.2d 912 (D. Idaho 2012), 
affirmed on appeal to the 9111 Circuit, Docket No. D.C. No. 2:09-cv-00505-REB. R. p. 542; Tr. p. 
28 lns. 13-25. Judge Wayman stated: 
When I reviewed the County's letter in this case stating they had not taken action, 
not stated in the letter was any real rationale why the county didn't take any 
action. The Court can infer that perhaps the county didn't really feel like taking 
any action simply because in the County of Shoshone v. United States case, a 2012 
decision from the District Court of the State ofldaho, there ' s a lot of work that 
goes into this kind of litigation. And part of the language that the Court used in 
that paiticular case lends great support to the county's position that the only way 
to establish a public right-of-way across United States controlled property is 
to file a federal lawsuit. 
R. p. 542; Tr. p. 28 Ins. 13-25. (emphasis added). 
And I'm dismissing the declaratory judgment action based upon jurisdictional 
grounds and the availability of other remedies. And I don't find that this Court 
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has jurisdiction to enter a declaratory judgment declaring a public right-of-
way across Federal land under the circumstances of this case. 
R. p. 544; Tr. p. 33 lns. 15-21. (emphasis added) . 
Contrary to this holding, "[I]t is well established that 'the decisions of lower federal 
courts are not binding on state courts, even on issues of federal law." English v. Taylor, 160 
Idaho 737,741,378 P.3d 1036, 1040, (2016) (quoting Dan Wiebold Ford, Inc. v. Universal 
Computer Consulting Holding, Inc., 142 Idaho 235,240, 127 P.3d 138, 143 (2005)). In deciding 
federal law, we will apply our own precedent and lower federal court decisions are not binding 
on this Court. English v. Taylor, 160 Idaho 737, 741--42, 378 P.3d 1036, 1040--41 (2016); Smith 
v. Smith, 160 Idaho 778, 786, 379 P.3d 1048, 1056 (2016). Thus, the District Court's reliance on 
Shoshone County v. United States, 912 F. Supp. 2d 912 (D. Idaho 2012) affirmed on appeal to 
the 9111 Circuit, Docket No. 2:09-cv-00505-REB, as mandating exclusive federal court 
jurisdiction was enoneous and should be reversed. 
D. The District Court Erred When it Inferred Facts Not in the Record and 
Speculated in Favor of Shoshone County as to Why Shoshone County Failed to Perform its 
Mandatory Duty under Idaho Code §40-208(7). 
The District Comi admittedly "inferred" facts not in the record and speculated as to why 
the County failed to perform its mandatory statutory duty. R. pp. 543-543; Tr. p.28 Ins. 13-21; 
Tr. p. 29, lns. 5-14. Judge Wayman Stated: 
When I reviewed the County's letter in this case stating they had not taken action, 
not stated in the letter was any real rationale why the county didn't take any 
action. The Court can infer that perhaps the county didn't really feel like 
taking any action simply because in the County of Shoshone v. United States 
case, a 2012 decision from the District Court of the State of Idaho, there's a 
lot of work that goes into this kind of litigation. 
The letter, without saying it, basically was communicating to the plaintiffs on 
behalf of the County, 'we really don't want to do this, and you might want to look 
at this case to see if that might help you.' So while it was a recognition of the 
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county not taking any action, it was also a recognition that there might be another 
way that the plaintiffs might wish to pursue that wouldn't involve the county or 
might not involve the county or might not involve the county initially but could 
involve the county later. 
R. pp. 543-543; Tr. p.28 lns. 13-21; Tr. p. 29, Ins. 5-14. (emphasis added). 
None of these facts, statements, or claims are stated anywhere in the record before the 
District Court. Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 56(c), when considering a summary judgment motion the 
Court must limit its review to facts supported in the record. The Court may not speculate or infer 
facts, statements, claims, or evidence not presented in the record. It was reversible error for the 
District Court to infer facts, statements, and claims on behalf of Defendant Shoshone County. 
The District Court's dismissal and its denial of summary judgment was erroneous and should be 
overturned by this Court. 
E. The District Court Erred when it Denied Nemeths' Summary Judgment 
Motion. 
The District Court erred in holding that Nemeths could not pursue a declaratory relief 
action to determine the validity of a public right-of-way. Halvorson v. North Latah County 
Highway District, 151 Idaho 196,254 P.3d 497 (2011) and Schneider v. Howe, 142 Idaho 767, 
133 P.3d 1232 (2006). 
In Schneider, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the District Cami' s smnmary judgment 
ruling granting declaratory relief pursuant to Idaho Code § 10-1201, to Plaintiffs on their public 
road claim. The underlying dispute in Schneider and with the Nemeths herein, is whether a 
public road exists and provides access to the Plaintiffs' real prope1iy. The Comi therein granted 
Plaintiffs declaratory relief, holding that a public road did exist. Id. The same result should have 
followed herein for Nemeths. The District Comi erred in this regard. 
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This matter involves a dispute over the existence of a roadway easement in 
Jefferson County. Respondent Glen A. Schneider as trustee of The Glen A. 
Schneider Revocable Trust (Schneider) sought a declaratory judgment that a 
public road easement existed over a portion of the Spencer subdivision (the 
subdivision) as shown on the plat of the subdivision. The case comes to this Court 
on appeal from the judgment of the district court confirming the existence of the 
easement. We affinn. 
Schneider v. Howe, 142 Idaho 767, 769, 133 P.3d 1232, 1234 (2006) (emphasis added). 
Second, the Declaratory Judgment Act provides authority for the courts to render 
declaratory judgments. State v. Rhoades, 121 Idaho 63, 69, 822 P.2d 960, 966 
(1991). However, the Declaratory Judgment Act does not relieve a paiiy from 
showing that it has standing to bring the action in the first instance. Selkirk-Priest 
Basin Assoc., Inc. v. State ex rel. Batt, 128 Idaho 831,834,919 P.2d 1032, 1035 
(1996). 
*** 
Based on these standards, Schneider has established he has standing to seek a 
declaratory judgment regarding the existence of the easement as shown in the plat 
because he has alleged a future injury. His affidavit establishes that he is seeking 
to subdivide his prope1iy and the easement offers the only possible access route 
for ingress and egress for a potential subdivision. Without confirmation of the 
existence of the easement, Schneider would have to go through a lengthy and 
expensive process to determine if his property could be subdivided with no 
confirmation that the proposed subdivision would have access. By seeking a 
declaratory judgment, Schneider avoids this harm and can be assured that one 
requirement for subdividing his property has been met prior to expending 
resources on designing the plat. Therefore, we hold that Schneider has 
standing to seek a declaratory judgment because he has demonstrated a 
specific future injury, and need not decide whether he has standing by vi1iue of 
being a citizen of Jefferson County. 
Schneider v. Howe, 142 Idaho 767, 772-73, 133 P.3d 1232, 1237-38 (2006). 
In Halvorson, the Idaho Supreme Court affinned a summary judgment preceding that 
dete1mined the public highway status of a disputed roadway. Plaintiffs Halvorson initiated the 
case by filing a complaint, which lead to a year and half of litigation, including summai·y 
judgment motions. Id.; 151 Idaho at 200. In their Complaint and throughout the summary 
judgment proceedings, Plaintiffs disputed the validity of the subject roadway as a public road. 
The District Comi granted summary judgment and the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed, holding: 
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B. The public status of Camps Canyon Road. 
1. The district court's basis for summary judgment 
The resolution of the Halvorsons' tort claims predicated upon injury to their 
property requires a determination of whether Camps Canyon Road is a public 
highway in order to evaluate whether an invasion of their rights has occurred. The 
district court found that Camps Canyon Road is a public highway by 
prescription as defined by I.C. § 40- 202(3) ("all highways used for a period 
of five (5) years, provided they shall have been worked and kept up at the 
expense of the public, or located and recorded by order of a board of 
commissioners, are highways"). This conclusion was based on the district 
court's finding that " [t]he record ... establishes that the public has used the road 
for more than five years, and that the Highway Department has worked and 
maintained the road at the expense of the public. 
2. The Halvorsons' arguments that validation proceedings were necessary to 
establish that Camps Canyon Road is a public highway 
The Halvorsons argue that it is not the province of the district court to establish 
the public nature of Camps Canyon Road. They cite Galvin v. Canyon County 
Highway District No. 4, for the proposition that the Highway District is not 
permitted to validate public rights on its own initiative except under certain 
circumstances. 134 Idaho 576, 579, 6 P.3d 826, 829 (2000). In effect, the 
Halvorsons argue that it is only through a validation proceeding initiated by an 
affected land-owner that the public nature of Camps Canyon Road can be 
dete1mined and that courts may not make such a dete1mination. 
This conclusion is incorrect. First, the statutory scheme provides not one but two 
routes for the establishment of a public highway. One route involves a hearing by 
the county commissioners. Because I.C. § 40- 202(3) provides for establishment 
of a public highway as "located and recorded by order of a board of 
commissioners," that method of establishing a highway obviously requires action 
of the county commissioners. However, no such requirement accompanies the 
process for the establishment of a highway by prescription. In the latter 
circumstance, a public highway exists where it is "used for a period of five (5) 
years, provided [it] shall have been worked and kept up at the expense of the 
public .... " LC. § 40-202(3). "When construing a statute, the words used must be 
given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning, and the statute must be construed 
as a whole." Athay v. Stacey, 142 Idaho 360, 365, 128 P.3d 897, 902 (2005) 
(citing Waters Garbage v. Shoshone Cnty., 138 Idaho 648, 651, 67 P.3d 1260, 
1263 (2003)). Here, the plain, usual, and ordinary meaning of the text is that the 
use and upkeep of a highway by the public is sufficient to establish a highway 
without any additional hearings or action undertaken by the Highway District. 
Halvorson v. N Latah Cty. Highway Dist., 151 Idaho 196, 202-04, 254 P.3d 497, 503-05 (2011) 
Thus, based on the foregoing examples and case holdings, it was reversible error for the 
District Court to dismiss the case and to deny Nemeths' summary judgment motion seeking 
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declaratory relief on their public road validation claim. Nemeths are entitled to proceed with 
their public road validation claim and to seek a judicial determination on the status of Granite 
Gulch Road as providing access to Nemeths' property. 
IV. REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES 
Nemeths are entitled to attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code§ 12-117. Under this 
statute, the Court "shall award the prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees, witness fees and 
other reasonable expenses, if it finds that the nonprevailing party acted without a reasonable 
basis in fact or law." Id. "The dual purpose of I. C. § 12-11 7 is to ( 1) deter groundless or 
arbitrary agency action; and (2) to provide 'a remedy for persons who have borne an unfair and 
unjustified financial burden attempting to correct mistakes agencies should never have made.' " 
Flying A Ranch, Inc. v. Cty. Commissioners of Fremont Cty., 157 Idaho 937,342 P.3d 649, 655-
56 (2015); Fuchs v. Idaho State Police, Alcohol Beverage Control, 153 Idaho 114, 117, 279 P.3d 
100, 103 (2012) (quoting Ralph Naylor Farms, LLC v. Latah Cnty., 144 Idaho 806, 809, 172 
P.3d 1081, 1084 (2007)). 
Given the complete silence on the record as to the facts that might suppo1i Shoshone 
County's failure to perform its mandatory statutory duty or to determine that Granite Gulch was 
a valid public R. S. 24 77 road, it follows as a matter of law that Shoshone County acted "without 
a reasonable basis in fact or law." Nemeths have been forced to bear "an unfair and unjustified 
financial burden to c01Tect Shoshone County's mistakes which never should have been made." 
Thus, pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 40 and LC. § 12-117, Nemeths are entitled to costs and 
attorney fees below and on appeal. It is respectfully requested that this honorable Comi so order. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Nemeths seek and are entitled to reversal of the District Court's Order of Dismissal. The 
District Court committed reversible error when it dismissed Nemeths' declaratory relief claim on 
grounds it lacked jurisdiction. The District Court committed reversible error when it ruled that 
federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over public road R.S. 2477 cases. The District Court 
committed reversible error when it cited and relied upon a lower federal court ruling as binding 
precedent for an Idaho State Court. The District Court committed reversible error when it denied 
summary judgment and relied upon speculation, inference, and unsupported facts not set out in 
the record. As a result of Shoshone County Board of County Commissioners' failure to perform 
its mandatory duties and due to its failure to act with a reasonable basis in fact or law, Shoshone 
County should be required to pay Nemeths ' attorneys fees and costs for this appeal and the 
District Court proceedings. 
DATED this 25th day of January, 2019. 
LUKINS & ANNIS, P.S . 
25 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
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Keisha L. Oxendine 
Shoshone County Prosecuting Attorney 
700 Bank Street, Ste. 120 
Wallace, ID 83873 
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